/116 cont./

000 etc., failed, hardly later than 1930, to start a violent conflict.
175 In the hegemonic action of the Mtuggi, the control of the lands
221 of transhumance and of the markets of the Dir gave the advan-
233 tage to the power of the plain, which used it wonderfully well to
[628] negotiate: shrewd discriminations, flexible finances, preferential
tariffs, all with a wide margin of abuse and individual transac-
[178] tion. These traits have disappeared since the pacification. By
[481] the same stroke some routes of transhumance have been aban-
doned, the security opening other, more advantageous ones.
"That is why the Idaw Mh'mud abandoned the pasturages of the
Mtugga, why the a. H'adduyws gave up the Dir of the Dwiran to
go to pasture on the Jbayl. These two former routes of transhu-
mance, indicated by M. J. Dresch, were no longer being used
already in 1941, when the work mentioning them appeared. It
[669] is even probable that the second was used only exceptionally in
the acute periods of the siba (1)."

1. Unpublished study by L. Robine on La transhumance dans la région d'Imintanout, 1949. Our debt with regard to him is considerable for this part of the account.

571 This "fiscality" of the great caids -- anachronistic word, of
431 course -- leads one to envisage the relations between the trans-
233 humant and his correspondent in the plain: çaheb or amddak-
221 k^{w}el. Whether they /117/ were individual or group, they no
longer arise from a debated contract, but from the exchange of
favors or of "sweetnesses," to speak like these rural people.
Hence, an ensemble of relations calling for, on the part of the
man of the plain, security for the montagnard and authorization
to share the pasture, in a general collective: it is a provisional
naturalization. The montagnard assumes the attitude of the
grateful beneficiary and of the protégé. At the time of his ar-
rival, he presents luqfa (from an Arabic root signifying "to set up"
/Fr. dresser/, corresponding to the Chleuh /Shluh/ sbidd, a verb
used in the expression sbidd l^{c}âr, "to enjoin riturally" -- but here

[Ait Mh'nd]

/178 cont./

634
613
312

General division of the group	Subdivision into basic ikhs-s	ikhs-s superadded	Origin of the superadded ikhs-s	Turn for water
a. Zbayr.	a. Umghar.			One day.
	a. u Mbark.			Three days, two of which for each of the partners alternatively.
	a. Âbdnnûr.			
a. Wajmirru.	a. Mençur.	a. Umzil.	a. H'ogg^{w}a expelled from Fensu a century ago.	Three days, two of which for each of the partners alternatively.
	a. H'sayn.	a. Lamin.	Demsira from Iguntar.	
		Imzilen.	Came from the Wijjan two centuries ago.	
		a. Lkut'ayn.	Ibuban.	
	a. Bakhkha.			One day.

312 N.B. The basin, called Chcharij ddu-lma, functions only from the rising to the setting of the sun. The irrigation roster covers eight days.

(613) Below, we shall find other details on the irrigation. Let us observe here and now that the order is rigorously gentilitial. The 634 adjunction of new elements, although of an antiquity sometimes 613 exceeding a century, has not at all influenced the dualist structure 173 669

[Ait Mh'nd]

/178 cont./

634 that was reflected up to the last times of siba /revolt/ in the
613 political rivalry between the two original ikhs-s: a. Umghar and
173 a. Bakhkha. The former was traditionally devoted to municipal
669 preponderance. The latter, to the agricultural initium. Neutral, the ikhs of the Imzilen provided conciliators: it was again asked recently, by a tumultuary election, for a customary judge. The a. Lamin started the war. The ait Umghar, having formed an alliance with the Idma and their emerging dynasty, the a. Anunu, consolidated their own power and ensured the advantage to the amghar Abdesslam b. Abdelmalek, father of the present chief.

634 Today, the a. Mh'nd include 120 foyers, to which it is
619 proper to add 44 emigrant ones, more or less settled outside.
592 These figures, at the time of the 1929 investigation, were respec-
162 tively 100 and 13 hearths. Progression of 1/5 in 20 years.

/179/ An Archaic Emigration

166 This emigration is an ancient phenomenon. The travelers
167 establish residence in the country of their choice, but keep their lands in their native country. They are seen again at harvest time. In April, 1951, a force of 60 men, that is, one from every two foyers, descended into the plain for the harvest. On the other hand, a worker emigration is still unknown.

About a third of the a. Mh'nd have settled outside of the
[179] Seksawa. This phenomenon, of ancient type, and not yet influenced by the industrial thrust of Morocco, doubtlessly has a certain documentary value. Among these emigrant foyers one counts: 1 settled in Marrakech, 4 in Casablanca, 3 at Imintanout, 3 at Agadir Inflas (Dwiran), 8 in ait Abdella, 2 at Ghdir Bnan, 4 in Ud Didan, 3 in Ud Mumna, 4 at Lalla^{c}Ariba, 1 in Ud Sawla (Ud Besseba^{c}), 10 at Tafttacht (Chyad'ma), 1 in ait ^{c}Aliwach (Mjjat'). That is, all departed toward the north.

It seemed interesting to find again in the plain, where they are within direct reach of the investigation, some of these temporary or definitive emigrants.

166 Brahim u H'ammo n-a. Umzil (60 years old), although living
159 at Agadir Inflas (Dwiran), still has all his relatives in a. Mh'nd.

/135 cont./

175 On the south versant of the Atlas, the development of the in-
*631 fluence of the Makhzen /makhzan/ in Taroudant succeeded during
*634 the same period in detaching new fractions from the group of the Tichka: the Ergita, the Mentaga lost their liberty, while the cantons of Talemt and Talekjont were attracting to them a part of the populations of the high valleys who were attached to them by bonds of secular alliance. Thus, in the course of the last three generations one has not ceased to see the boundaries of Berbère /Berber/ independence progressively shrink.

Finally, for twenty years, the group of the fractions that in spite of everything had succeeded in preserving outward independence, by an unexpected consequence of the struggle against the great chiefs, has in turn had to sacrifice internal freedom. By a
• [669] series of small revolutions, most of the tribes of the high mountains have been led to reject the oligarchic regime in order to accept the more energetic and at the same time more flexible government of the minor chiefs who have taken the title of "amghar." Among the Seksawa, personal power has successively appeared in the fractions of the Aït ʿAbdallah, the Aït Lhasen, the Idma, the Aït Haddiyous, and by degrees the movement has attracted the Demsira, the Ida Ou Mahmoud, the Gedmiwa of the upper valleys.

*631 Nevertheless, the transformation has taken place more slowly
*634 in the high mountains than in the middle valleys because the traditions remained stronger. Under the supreme authority of the
[178] "amghars," one still sees the "Aït Arbaʿin" and the "moqāddems" holding their councils in our day. It is no less certain that the progressive development of personal power prepares and announces the final ruin of the last center of resistance of the Genfisa and the
[648] general transformation of the Berbère /Berber/ institutions. If our intervention, which stopped the political rivalry of the great chiefs in these independent regions, had not disturbed the natural course of evolution, the amghars of the Seksawa would already have been able to ally themselves with the strongest neighboring great kaid and make /136/ the last traces of the government of the assemblies
[578] disappear in their turn. For the moment, inaccessible in their secluded valleys, the minor independent chiefs, divided by the

/136 cont./

*631 *634 [578] traditional quarrels of the fractions of the high mountains, stir about in their minuscule states; they patiently wait for a favorable occasion for having the authority that they have acquired recognized for their profit. Thus the last stage of the political evolution of this high-mountain region will be realized by submission and the direct recognition of their power by the Makhzen /makhzan/ (1).

[648]

1. Since the French penetration in the Atl[illegible] has been accentuated, the minor chiefs of the Seksawa have submitted directly, without passing through the agency of the Bouaboud chiefs, to our bureaus of native affairs in 1927. The Ida ou Tanan followed their example a few months later.

*631 619 121 Without having the importance of the independent group of the Tichka, whose state permits us to understand the whole evolution of the Atlas of the Masmouda, since we can observe there all the phases of the political transformation of the tribes, the autonomous fractions of the Sirwa nevertheless afford particular interest. They represent in our day the only vestige of ancient [178] institutions preserved within the great command of the Glawa and [174] help us to find again what the social organization of this whole region was before the rapid and destructive conquest of 1913.

*631 *634 619 [669] [712] It is thanks to their isolation that the small groups of pastoralists of the Ikhzamen, Aït Maghlif, Aït ʿAbdallah, Aït Qalla, in the confederation of the Aït Waouzgit, have up to now escaped the total ruin that struck the republics of the neighboring valleys. As a matter of fact, near the summits of the Sirwa efforts of resistance to the political transformation were concentrated around large "agadirs" similar to the fortresses of the Anti-Atlas, which enclose at the same time the citadel, the mosque, the general storehouse, and even the bank of these little rude cities. But before the subjugation of the country, many cantons of the Aït *634

/261 cont./

343 penetrating into the territory of the small republics of the sum-
712 mits profited by every occasion to make them disappear. One
178 of them was declaring to us with satisfaction that he had had the
726 luck to ruin 12 in seven years of command (1).

[175]
[669]

1. It is interesting to point out that the general decline of the institution was interrupted in the middle of the century in certain regions. The "siba" /revolt/ that marked the death of Moulay ʿAbd er Rahman in 1859 had consequences so disastrous for all the tribes established between Imi n Tanout and Amismiz, following incursions of plundering Arabs from the plain, that certain villages surrounded themselves with ramparts and rapidly built fortified enclosures, in the middle of which they hollowed out silos.

These small fortresses were besides most often inhabited by minor chiefs who emerged amidst the siba struggles and took responsibility themselves to ensure the defense of the common property. They were entirely different in nature and arrangement from the small agadirs of hamlets, whose ruins still exist.

Again it is necessary to distinguish from the collective storehouses of the fractions or villages other agadirs constructed by the Makhzen /makhzan/, at Amismiz, for example, and in which the tribes came to pay the "ʿachour" /Koranic tax/. By a natural extension, the same name of agadir designates at present all the casbahs built by order of the sultans or by the chiefs of the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/.

343 But the political state of the country is not alone in entailing
712 the disappearance of the collective storehouses; it indeed seems
178 that economic causes, or perhaps simply the weakening of a long

/269 cont./

642 appearance of personal power; a family in a high valley succeeds
*634 in consolidating the /270/ precarious organization that has
178 created, to its advantage, a successful leader; one then sees for two or three generations the activity of the councils of "inflas" weaken or disappear and the struggle of the rival "ikhs" stop; the social life itself changes, and the distance between the rich and the poor, the strong and the humble, increases rapidly. A little apart from this village, where all lived in apparent equality not long ago, the fortified house of the amghar and his brothers soon rises. Finally the external policy of the little state is also transformed and becomes more bellicose. The combative ardor
[578] of the opposed "ikhs," without employment within, finds in the
[613] leff quarrels the means of spending the surplus forces of the
[616] "taqbilt."

If general causes exert themselves at a distance to facilitate
• [669] the development of despotic power, rising spontaneously in a canton, several small revolutions break out at the same time in various parts of the mountains. One soon sees a new regime of government established, which by degrees prevails. Such is the
[175] spectacle that was presented by the western Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ twice in the last 50 years: first of all, in the middle of the nineteenth century, in the regions now subject to the great kaids, during the period that preceded and facilitated their domination; then, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the parts of the mountains remaining free, when the political pressure of the masters of the casbahs of Bouaboud, Tagontaft, and Telwet on the republics of the high valleys was accentuated.

121 Having reached this point in our investigation, we must try
*634 to see clearly the conditions under which the authority of the
178 amghars rises and develops, and what institutions -- precarious, without doubt, and imperfect like their power itself -- they substitute for the ones of the small republics that they have destroyed.

121 This research does not proceed without presenting numerous
*634 difficulties. In order to carry it out, at the risk of losing the way
669 in the thousand details of Berbère /Berber/ life, and without fear

/270 cont./

121 of tiring the reader's patience, it is necessary to draw his attention
*634 often to the little revolutions taking place in obscure cantons,
*[669] to observe their local consequences, and to compare them with one another. Indeed, without taking hold of precise examples, one cannot come to understand the essential aspects of this eminently unstable and ephemeral form of transition between the government of the assemblies and /271/ the one of the kaids. On the other hand, the history of the last three generations is rich enough in the Atlas of the Masmouda to offer us a choice among a large number of amghars -- about 40 -- whose similar origins and the identical mode of growth indicate rather well that they appear and develop while obeying the same rules. It will suffice for us, in order to show what these conditions for the rise of personal power are, to choose and study here the clearest and simplest examples.

*634 II. The struggle of the soffs and the appearance of the
578 amghar. -- The private wars, which so often trouble the life of
613 the independent republics, above all have as their cause, as we have seen, the existence of several rival "ikhs" always ready to appeal to force as soon as their interests appear to them to be threatened. Each "taqbilt" always possesses, in fact, among the ten or fifteen families that form it, two or three stronger, richer, and more warlike groups, to whom the others come to seek support. These are soffs naturally constituted and which exist at least potentially.
[571]

The heads of these most important families of the canton conduct as they like the deliberations of the council, in the bosom of which the equality of the "Aït Arba'in" is purely specious. The temptation is great for the influential members of the little senate to entrust the office of moqaddem to a candidate who defends their interests exclusively; a struggle frequently breaks out in the course of this nomination, and in the melee an ambitious man triumphs with the support of the strongest "ikhs." He often gets to exercise the magistrature for several years and

/332 cont./

175 established in the Azaghar of the Aït Zelten. At rare intervals,
*631 however, the minor kaid of Bouaboud, Mohammed n Aït Mousa,
578 had obtained the command of the Nfifa and of the Demsira, but
he had not been able to succeed in having his authority accepted.
175 Cutting trees, razing villages, he had left only memories of hate
*631 in the mountains, and the "siba" had driven him away. During
726 the revolt of the tribes at the beginning of Sidi Mohammed's
[669] reign, from 1859 to 1864, El Hajj ᶜAbdallah Ou Bihi even succeeded for a time in expelling his enemies from Bouaboud and named among the Mtougga three minor kaids at his disposal, supported by a small "makhzen" of Haha warriors. Finally fortune turned: Bihi Ajerram -- a Mtouggi of the fraction of the Ida ou Merzoug, allied with the Haha, great enemy of the kaids of Bouaboud, was assassinated, and /333/ some years afterwards ᶜAbdallah Ou Bihi himself perished at Marrakech, poisoned by the Sultan (1868). Immediately the Mtougga, who aspired to take the place left vacant by the effacement of the Haha, rushed toward the Sous and Taroudant. If the kaid el Hajj ᶜOmar (1)

1. The chiefs of the Mtougga have been successively the kaid Ahmed n Ait Sᶜadoun, El Hajj ᶜAddi, died in prison at Mogador about 1845, then the three brothers: Mohammed, died about 1859, El Hajj ᶜOmar, died about 1880, and El Hajj Mesaᶜoud, died about 1890, finally ᶜAbd el Malek ben Mohammed (1886-1927). A younger branch, in a steadfast manner, has held the office of Khalifat /caliphate/ of the kaid; thus there have succeeded one another: El Cheger Mousa, brother of the kaid ᶜAddi, the moqaddem El Housin, son of El Cheger, died in 1892, and his sons, Si Bou Selham and Si Mohammed.

of Bouaboud, who had succeeded the kaid Mohammed, suffered serious repulses in his distant expeditions, he at least cleverly

/335 cont./

175 Brahim, chief of the leff of the "Aït Iraten" for a long time, has
*631 already resisted the amghar Mohammed Ibibat. Si el Madani has
*634 on his side the mountain, all the fractions of the Glawa, the
726 "Inemzel" leff for the most part, and the Ouneila, at war with
[648] the Aït Zineb for possession of a limitrophe village. The power of the amghar ᶜAli grows in the course of these battles; his prestige eclipses that of the amghars of Tazenakht; his casbah of Tamdakht is extended and fortified; around him live ever more numerous companions, commanded by a "mechaouri," a kind of chief of the mercenaries. For long months the Glawa are even forced /336/ to defend the entrance to their territory at Imirgen; Si Hammadi, Madani's brother, is beseiged by a rebel in his casbah of Taourirt of the Warzazat. Finally, after several years of efforts, the Makhzen /makhzan/ wins, the Glawa advance as far as Tamdakht. Their cartridge rifles enable them to fight innumerable warriors of the Aït Waouzgit on the plain with advantage. The siege of the casbah of the amghar ᶜAli goes on in spite of the difficulties created by the fury of the tribes; each of the artificial grottoes hollowed out of the cliff of the wadis encloses marksmen
[913] who decimate the assailants. Finally the Krupp cannon is brought to 300 meters from the rampart, out of reach of the flintlock rifles. Thirty shells are fired point-blank, piercing some breaches in the rampart, and the qsar /fortified place/ is won after a bloody battle. The amghar ᶜAli, fleeing in the desert, is overtaken and his throat cut, and his head is sent to Telwet. The tribes of the Aït Waouzgit accept the authority of the Glawa (1900). For a few years all resistance disappears; the subjugation of the Dadès, an expedition to the Todgha and to the Tafilelt complete the victory.

Si Tayeb Gontafi profits no less fortunately by favorable circumstances. During the short "siba" that broke out upon the
[669] death of the Sultan, the tribes of the Dir north of the Atlas revolted and put to flight their minor kaids, who sought refuge at Moulay Ibrahim of the Kik. The tribe of the Ouzgita is without a chief; Si Tayeb advances with his forces and takes possession of Agergour, where the enemy of his father, the kaid Brahim, so

/336 cont./

175 often assembled expeditions against the amghar of Tagontaft.
*631 The Gontafi establishes one of his relatives in the casbah of
*634 Agergour, and for 30 years, except during the time of the su-
726 premacy of the Glawa, he will firmly maintain this conquest.
In 1897, after long preparations, Si Tayeb undertakes to subdue the tribes of the south of Tagontaft; two high valleys of the Gedmiwa, the Ogdemt and the Aghbar near Talat n Yaqoub and Tagontaft, are won, then the harka of the Gontafi descends toward the Aït Semmeg, the Onein, and the Ihouziyoun, breaking the resistance of the tribes whenever it manifests itself. A revolt
•[669] of the Aghbar in which the independent "taqbilt" of the Seksawa and from south of the Tichka participate stops the distant expeditions for a time; then Si Tayeb departs again for the Sous and among the Inda ou Zal engages the Aït Semmeg of the South and the Souktana, while relying on the leff of the "Igezzoulen." A serious defeat stops him at the Aït Mimoun, among /337/ the Souktana; wounded in combat, he goes back to his mountain fortress and henceforth contents himself with organizing his conquests (1902).

175 ᶜAbd el Malek Mtouggi, like the Gontafi, has utilized the
*631 "siba" to put himself in the place of the minor chiefs of the Dir
726 of the north of the Atlas. He intervenes among the Mzouda, the
[669] Frouga and establishes himself at Amismiz, in the place left vacant by the kaid in flight. The confederation of the Gedmiwa is then divided between the two neighboring great kaids: the plain and the Dir revert to ᶜAbd el Malek, and Si Tayeb appropriates the mountains. Inversely from the other two great kaids -- the Glawi and the Gontafi -- who are leaving on expeditions toward the south, the Mtouggi reserves all his efforts for the tribes of the Marrakech plain, and although possession of the Ida Ou Ziki and Mesgina guarantees him access to the Sous plain, he hesitates to get involved there. This is because a dangerous rival is growing in importance on his flanks in the person of the kaid Saᶜid of the Ida Ou Gelloul, at the center of the Haha country. A favorite of the vizier Ba Hmad, the "Gellouli" even obtains at that moment command of the plain of the Chtouka and of Tiznit.

/337 cont./

175 *631 726 The only remedy is to excite against him the kaid of the Neknafa, Ahmed ben Mbarek Anflous, who makes a balance to him. But on the death of the all-powerful vizier protector of the Gellouli (1900), the favor of the Makhzen /makhzan/ passes to Ahmed Anflous, who in turn gets the command of Tiznit; in these circumstances, ᶜAbd el Malek Mtouggi does not believe the moment favorable to get involved in distant conquests; he contents himself with subjugating and pillaging the tribes of the Demsira, Nfifa, and Dwiran.

175 *631 726 648 V. The great kaids during the anarchy of the Empire (1902-1913) -- The appeal launched by the Sultan to all the kaids of the Empire to come to fight against the rebel Bou Hamara, who had become threatening between Fez and Taza, comes then to interrupt for a time the conquests of the chiefs of the Atlas. They themselves assemble the warriors of their tribes and go to fight in the Gharb. But the defeat of the sherifian mehalla in the Rif and its rout toward Oudjda and Oranie clearly show them the impotence of the Makhzen /makhzan/. Having come back to their mountains just in time to restore order and to stop the "siba" that their absence was enough to cause to break out, the three Berbère /Berber/ kaids felt themselves becoming, in the general anarchy of the Empire, the uncontested masters of the South. We see them then consolidate their /338/ fortresses and construct new ones; next they actively take up their military undertakings again, as if they understood that their future depends solely on the power that they will have succeeded in establishing during the period of confusion henceforth opened.

175 *631 598 Up to now each of them had directed his efforts on the regions nearest his casbah and especially toward the plains easy to subdue. But the great commands now come to touch one another; causes of conflict multiply. The Onein, between the domains of the Glawa and Gontafa, is the object of dissension, and the partisans of the two chiefs come to blows. The high valleys of the Gedmiwa and Seksawa are disputed between the Mtouggi and the Gontafi, and each favors several amghars in the hope of getting

/349 cont./

*631 The Glawa's taking possession of the large confederation of
*634 the Aït Waouzgit will make it clearly understood under what con-
721 ditions /350/ such a conquest is realized and how they proceed in the exploitation of the country.

175 At the time when Si el Madani Glawi began his political
*631 action among the Aït Waouzgit about 1890, the ancient institu-
*634 tions were still very much alive in part of the confederation.
616 About ten cantons of the summits of the Sirwa and of the Azilal
198 had preserved their Aït arbaᶜin and their small senates. In the valleys were found amghars, masters of a single canton, but who, by means of the institution of the leffs, extended their authority over some nearby groups; such were the chiefs of the cantons of the Aït Tigdi Ouchen at Tafounan, those of the Zenaga at Ighil n Ogho, of Taliwin in the Zagmouzen, of Tazoult in the tribe of the Souktana, of Dou Taourirt among the Aït Semmeg, of Tamjerjt among the Aït ou Hamden; finally, of Takhorbant among the Aït Wartassa of the Azilal. Moreover, more important chiefs had conquered small commands most often formed, as we have seen, of cantons of the two leffs. These were the amghars of the Aït Tadrart to the southwest of the Sirwa and, closer to the Atlas, the amghars of Tamedakht and Tifoultout among the Aït Zineb.

The working of the leffs seems to us to be noticeably disturbed from this period on among the Aït Waouzgit by the ambitions of the amghars. In the Azilal, "combat leffs," "imqan n mokahelt," are constituted according to the circumstances. As has already been said, we no longer get to re-establish a rigorous correspondence be-
[578] tween the alliances of the cantons of the Atlas and those of the Tifnout; contradictions also appear to the south of the Sirwa at the junction of the "Inemzel-Aït Iraten" leffs with those of the "Isouktan" and "Igezzoulen" of the Anti-Atlas. This state of division favors the intrigues of the Glawa.

175 Four wars of conquest are necessary for the chiefs of Telwet to
*631 manage to reduce the large confederation. At the beginning, about
*634 1890, the whole country resists, without distinction as to leff, the
616 penetration of the Makhzen /makhzan/, and the alliance of the
726 "Inemzel," the party of the Glawa, comes to detach from the
•[669]

175 /350 cont./
*631 refractory bloc only the cantons of the Aït Tawiya and of the
*634 Ikhzamen, enemies of the Aït Imini; next comes the revolt of
616 the amghar ʿAli of Tamedakht, supported by the whole confed-
726 eration, and which comes to an end with his death. About 1906
•669 the amghar Zanifi of Tazenakht rises in his turn, aided by the amghars of the Azilal; the policy of Telwet then succeeds in winning in the two leffs the Aït Tawiya, Ikhezamen /sic/, the Aït Oubial, Aït Atman, and the /351/ Inmarakht and breaking up the coalition; finally, after the great siba, from 1910 to 1913, the heavily armed Glawa subjugate the valleys and put an end to the violent quarrels of the amghars in the Azilal.

175 During these 25 years of fighting, the leff of the "Inemzel,"
*631 traditional ally of the Glawa, showed itself in the country of the
*634 Aït Waouzgit to be nearly as hostile to the kaid of Telwet as the
616 leff of the Aït Iraten, except, however, among the Ikhzamen and
726 the Aït Tawiya; most often it was the ambitions of the amghars and their rivalries that enabled the Makhzen /makhzan/ chiefs to dissociate the forces of resistance.

175 Tired of the country's successive revolts, the Glawa, starting
178 from 1913, undertake to organize the country in such a way as to
*631 break all resistance. Their first concern is to destroy, upon the
*634 passage of the harka, all the agadirs that they perceive in the
726 valleys of the Tifnout, of the Azilal, and of the Zagmouzen; later, all circumstances will be utilized to ruin the collective fortresses of the small mountain republics. The most powerful amghars disappear; they are replaced by minor sheiks, often without real influence, who become simple tax collectors under the orders of the caliphates; the "Ijmaʿan," those notables whose authority was imposed on the Aït Arbaʿin and directed the policy of the small autonomous cantons, also give way to effaced sheiks; the "Aït Arbaʿin" sometimes still exist, serving as intermediaries with the families and applying the customary law to the extent that the representative of the kaid tolerates it.

175 Four solid command-houses are built at the most important
*631 points in the conquered territory, in the Tidili, at Assarag of the
*634 Tifnout, at Assaka of the Aït ou Hamden in the Azilal, at
727
712

/355 cont./

*631 *634 178 616 726 obstinate resistance at least procured for the Aït Mhand ou Mousa the preserving of their Aït Arbaᶜin and their moqaddems, accepting only a liaison agent who plays the role of amghar.

The Tamarout fraction lost all its own institutions and has become similar, thanks to the action of the sheik Agzal, to its neighbors of the trail of the Makhzen /makhzan/. The Aït Breher, Aït Chaᶜib and Aït Tilet of the "Imsifern" leff resisted better. The first two of these "taqbilt" united closely to fight against the Mtougga's attempts at penetration. They restored the organization of moqaddems with more vigor than in the past. The [671] customary law alone is applied in their territory, to the exclusion of the religious law; the moqaddems are changed regularly, and choosing them from overly powerful families is avoided for fear of seeing appear amghars whose first concern would be to favor the policy of the kaids. The Aït Chaᶜib showed themselves to be the indomitable adversaries of the caliphates of the Mtouggi for an especially long time and consented to submit only on the express condition of preserving a preferential regime. They pay Bouaboud only the ᶜachour and some "frida." The Aït Tilet, the most distant, have remained apart up to now, and the amghar of the Aït Haddiyous, Ahmed ou Moulid, counts them among the independent "taqbilt" of the summits, whose destinies he tries to guide.

*631 *634 XIV. The zones of influence (the Seksawa). -- The Mtouggi's clever policy in the penetration of the Demsira is completed in the high mountains, as we have seen several times, by alliances that he concluded with the amghars of the Seksawa. In that region, where up to these recent years the intrigues coming out of the casbahs of Bouaboud and Tagontaft have crossed, one perceives more /356/ easily at present how the amghars most often prepare, without knowing it, the establishment of the domination of the great chiefs.

[178] [642] [175] [669] The appearance of "despotic power" at the end of the nineteenth century in the region remaining faithful on the whole to the regime of moqaddems and assemblies is not explained solely by the normal workings of oligarchic institutions; the frequency of

*631 /356 cont./
*634 minor revolutions taking place in the high valleys finds its cause
178 in the interest taken by the great kaids in the political transfor-
175 mation of the tribes.
642
669 The masters of the casbahs would actually not be able to enter into relations with the turbulent councils of Aït Arbaᶜin, always ready to question their orders and call on the friendship of the nearby republics in order to refuse to pay them the tax. Thus submission can only be contrived through the agency of personal power, which must be created first of all. From then on, the great kaids are seen to favor with all their means the notables capable of imposing their authority on assemblies too respectful of custom and attached to independence. In all circumstances
*631 we shall find these amghars disposed to treat with the great chiefs
*634 or the Makhzen /makhzan/ at the moment when conquest be-
178 comes inevitable. They will then present themselves as natural
648 intermediaries between the tribe that they have reduced and the power of the kaids who speak in the name of the Sultan. It is to their interest to handle carefully both the opposed sides and to facilitate the transformation of the country, which has become inevitable through the progress of the great chiefs. To succeed
*631 better in this, they themselves try to propagate, from canton to
*634 canton, the despotic regime that they have succeeded in install-
178 ing in their "taqbilt" (1).

1. It is in this way that in the high valleys of the Asif el Mal the amghars of the Aït Gair, ᶜAbderrahman Irro and his sons, were supported by the sheiks of the Ind Maghous, the Aït Jaᶜfar, most often devoted to the policy of the Gontafa. The Iwonsekten of the same leff underwent the same evolution under the same influence. The Imelwan also have amghars supported by the chief of the Aït Haddiyous of the Seksawa. The Aït Tiksit, of the "Imsifern" leff, rallied to the amghars of the Talekjont through the agency of their Tigouga neighbors, in turn got rid of their

/362 cont./

*631 Aside from the most avowed enemies whom he has forced into exile, the great kaid has on the spot all the adversaries whom his incessant abuses have created for him. He himself does not have, as we know, a feeling for exercising within his command the charge of the government of the tribes, but he seeks only to bring to bear a domination that he wants as productive as possible; the notion of the public good is foreign to him; his companions, whose support is /363/ indispensable to him, are usually still more greedy and their attachment to the common cause often depends only on the profits that they count on reaping from the support given to the master.

*631 578 *669 The abuses resulting from this state of mind exasperate the latent antagonism that we have already observed between the despotic power of the amghar and the democratic and egalitarian feeling of the masses; revolt is ready to spring up again in the tribes at the first embarrassment of the kaids; indeed, one observes that it breaks out on the frontiers of the command as soon as a piece of bad news for the chief, true or false, spreads in the country.

*631 593 In addition, another cause of weakness that does not cease to assume greater importance with time is the predilection for discord and intrigue in the very family of the kaid. The large number of children, the rivalry of the wives facilitate disagreements that soon end in the dispersion of authority. This, as one knows, is one of the most active ferments of anarchy within the Mussulman states. Islam, in growing stronger in the mountains, brings it with it to the Berbères /Berbers/ in their small commands.

*631 The great chief of the Atlas -- at least at the time when France has not yet guaranteed his authority -- knows all these reasons for fearing the future; he lives in uneasiness, the fear of the dagger or poison; immense tribal contingents follow him to war today, but he knows that perhaps tomorrow he will have no more to protect him in the "siba" than a handful of brothers and his faithful slaves. One quite well imagines under these conditions *631 175 648 the terror that could have been cast into the hearts of the mountain lords in 1912 by the preaching of the "blue men," Arabs from

/379 cont./

Nevertheless, it sometimes happens under the sultan's domination that one sees personal power reconstituted, that a clever and enterprising kaid, putting his ambitions at the service of the Makhzen, succeeds in obtaining a large command in Berbère /Berber/ country, so that he appears to us, at a distance, with the same features as the semi-independent chiefs of the mountains. But if one wishes to examine carefully the conditions under which his power was developed and exercised, one perceives how much the forces on which he depends have changed; less solidly built on the base of a canton or tribe, less well supported by leff alliances, without a durable foundation in the country, his power remains precarious and rests above all on the confidence and support of the sovereign. If the latter withdraws his favor, the great makhzen kaid disappears into the void.

The example of the career of El Hajj ᶜAbdallah Ou Bihi, a great chief who in the middle of the last century, in the country of the Haha, had a prestige comparable to the lords of the Glawa, will suffice to make us understand how much the power of such a kaid is contrary, by numerous traits, to that of the masters of the mountain tribes.

ᶜAbdallah Ou Bihi appears about 1844. His family has been in the service of the Makhzen for 60 years; already settled at Mogador, it commands from afar the country of the Haha under the supervision of the governor of the town. Abdallah himself is the son of a black slave, and tradition relates the strange fact that his mother was given pregnant to the kaid of the Haha by Sultan Moulay Sliman, which leaves hovering over his true origins a complete mystery, which legend has seized.

/380/ After difficult beginnings and discords with the minor kaid of the Mtougga, whom the sultan has thrown into prison, ᶜAbdallah Ou Bihi undertakes to subjugate the tribes of his command in revolt since the bombardment of Mogador by the French fleet and cursed by Moulay ᶜAbd er Rahman. At this period in the country of the Haha one no longer finds stable leffs constituted by traditional alliances, in the manner of those of the Nefis or of the country of the Glawa, but only fragile associations of "khoms" or

/385 cont./

648 619 669 VIII. The siba. -- The "siba," the revolt, can be regarded as a veritable institution in subjugated country. It enables the tribes to deliver themselves from their servitude for a time, to take back their goods that have fallen into the possession of the Makhzen /makhzan/, to taste the joys of anarchy for a few years, the better later to take their place again in the Empire to which they are henceforth bound forever.

The "siba" occurs each time that the authority of the Makhzen suffers a serious defeat or weakens and shows its powerlessness. The best signal for the revolt is given by the death of the Sultan, since everyone expects -- thanks to a millenary experience -- that several pretenders will dispute his succession, arms in hand, will enlist the tribes as followers, and that disorder will reign until the strongest or cleverest has won. [175] The longest crises of anarchy that the South of Morocco has known for a century and a half are the great siba of seven years, after the death of Sidi Mohammed Ben ᶜAbdallah (1790-1797), that of the death of Moulay ᶜAbd er Rahman (1859-1864), that of the death of Moulay el Hasan (1894-1897). Moreover, the tribes have /386/ manifested by innumerable local revolts their impatience with tolerating the yoke of the Makhzen.

The news of the defeat of the Sultan's armies or that of his death is hardly known in the towns before it is propagated with an inconceivable rapidity to the most distant Berbère /Berber/ tribes.

175 648 669 When the sultan Sidi Mohammed drowned in the basin of the Aguedal in Marrakech in 1875, his son Sidi El Hasan was vigorously occupied in restoring order in the land of the Haha, troubled for the last eight years after the death of El Hajj ᶜAbdallah Ou Bihi. The black slaves, his horsemen, his mokhaznis, scattered throughout the confederation, were trying to enumerate the possessions of the Makhzen and were living grandly on the heavy fines imposed on the Berbères /Berbers/. Suddenly the inhabitants learned of the event, before it had come to the knowledge of the Sultan's son. In a second, the state of the country was changed; the wolves became lambs, and it was with great difficulty that the servants of the Makhzen regained the casbah of Bou Riqi under the

/386 cont./

175 hooting of the Berbères /Berbers/. Sidi El Hasan was clever
648 enough to promise the command of their tribe to the principal
669 notables and succeeded in stopping a movement of revolt that
*631 would have been fatal to him. He was proclaimed the same day by the sheiks of the Haha promoted to kaids.

175 Upon the death of Moulay el Hasan, whose reign had been
648 marked, however, by serious efforts to organize the tribes of the
669 South, the news of his disappearance made the "siba" break out
*631 at one blow in all the subjugated country south of the Tensift, and all the casbahs were besieged. The kaids, then in a harka with the ruler in the Gharb, left the Sultan's camp by double stages, sought refuge with Si ᶜAïsa ben ᶜOmar, the powerful kaid of the ᶜAbda, and from there reached their country in secret. Only the most powerful, the Mtouggi, the Gontafi, the Glawi, succeeded in finding refuge in their great fortresses; most of the other chiefs had to go to take refuge at the tombs of the most venerated marabouts, while their houses were looted and the lands taken back by their former masters.

At the time of the "siba" that was caused in 1904 by the difficulties of the sultan Moulay ᶜAbd el ᶜAziz, at grips with Bou Hamara, we see the minor chiefs hold fast behind the battlements of their ramparts, lend one another mutual support, thanks to the loyalty of /387/ their slaves and mokhaznis, and succeed in re-establishing their previous situation only at the price of long months of effort.

178 The first concern of the Berbères /Berbers/, after besieging
669 and ruining the kaid's house, is to bring together a council of
*631 notables and to try to re-establish the institutions of old. One can
*634 even say that there is no surer way to judge the state of transformation of a subjugated region than to observe the nature of its "siba" organization. In the high mountains where the memory of the moqaddems has not yet disappeared, although a sheik has governed the canton for long years, the constitution of the little Berbère /Berber/ state is integrally re-established; lower, on the slopes, the notables chosen, according to the same rules as formerly, in the different hamlets of the former "taqbilt" take the title

/387 cont./

178 of Aït Arba^{c}in and enact a scale of fines, but they are no longer
669 capable of designating a president; on the Dir or in the plains it
*631 is the sheiks themselves who make up the tribal council, each
*634 canton having lost the recollection of its political personality;
they are content to put the sedition-mongers in a hole, without restoring the regulation that punishes each offense with a specific fine; their concern moreover is to keep the common people away, and they dream above all of the ways that will permit them to obtain the kaid's place by intrigue as soon as the revolt has ended. It sometimes happens that the makhzen chief has governed his tribe with moderation, and no serious reason for expulsion is raised against him; then a place in the council is left for him, but only in the capacity of notable: "You will be our anflous porte-bonheur," they said, at the time of the siba of Sidi Mohammed, to the old kaid of the Mzouda, whom they did not want to drive out of his house. The popular movement, which won over the whole country during the "siba," took on such force that the Berbère /Berber/ mind had to be given this satisfaction of principle in order to succeed in keeping a beloved leader (1).

[113]

1. Cf. our study on "Le Régime juridique du Sud-Marocain /The Juridical Regime of the Moroccan South/," Hespéris, 1924, p. 323.

*631 Cantons and tribes left to themselves, incapable of re-estab-
*634 lishing in all their strength the institutions that they abandoned
long ago, soon fall into frightful anarchy. The enthusiasm of the
648 first days is succeeded by the weariness of disorder in proportion
669 as the struggles of soffs, the combats of cantons that unite again
178 to form war alliances analogous /388/ to the leffs of old, are re-
[616] peated. Then the Sultan takes back his authority, the kaids re-appear in the plains, harkas are formed to re-establish the banished chiefs in their command on the Dir; little by little people lose confidence in the tribe; the Aït Arba^{c}in are abandoned and betrayed; the Makhzen puts them in prison; and without too much regret the Berbères /Berbers/ again assume the heavy collar

*631 /388 cont./
*634 of submission, like beasts pacified by an instant's revolt against
648 too burdensome a yoke.
•669 But it is especially at the time of local revolts, justified by
178 the excesses of a foreign chief's domination and maintained by the vitality of the traditions of independence, that the struggle is prolonged. At the beginning of the movement, caliphates and mokhaznis have been betrayed and massacred; each has retaken his possessions and prepared his weapons. Upon the arrival of the forces of the Makhzen /makhzan/, the warriors defend their territory energetically; then, before the progress of the harka, flee into the nearby mountains with their families and flocks. The
[727] kaid then has the villages destroyed and, if the "siba" is prolonged, the olive and palm trees cut down. El Hajj ᶜAbdallah Ou Bihi proceeded in this way among the Aït ᶜAisi, and the chiefs of the Mtougga did the same in the country of the Ida Ou Ziki, in ruins today.

178 IX. The disappearance of Berbère /Berber/ institutions. --
*631 If we had to point out, at the end of this long evolution that
648 changed the independent republics into tribes subject to the Sultan, the most important transformations that took place in the life of the Berbère /Berber/ country, our choice would turn to the growth of the political units, the development of wars, and the slow, but sure disappearance of the old law.

*[634] In constituting their commands, the amghars contributed toward erasing the boundaries of the cantons, which formerly separated the small autonomous states. Later, the long and patient effort of the Makhzen /makhzan/ reunited these often hostile groups within the frontiers of one tribe; a new fractioning made ancient divisions disappear to only a memory; finally, a single chief received from the sultan the right to command. This enlargement of the cadre of local life is the result of wars and revolts without number; it was acquired at the price of sufferings that cannot be added up without some sadness; perhaps it had to be this way in order /389/ that the little mountain societies might succeed in finding their place in the Empire.

182 /411 cont./
792 it manages, in voluntary isolation, to remain apart from the
795 Makhzen /makhzan/.

*631 However that may be, the long influence of the religious
792 leaders in the past leaves no traces in a large part of the South of
178 Morocco in our day other than the presence of their respected tombs; their descendants live without glory in poor villages, and the only role that they still can play is to arbitrate simple family quarrels. In former times they tried to stop the evolution of the country threatened by the Makhzen by exerting in favor of the tribes a resistance that permitted them to found states. But in the course of the /412/ last century, the progress of the Empire made exercise of their authority impossible; the history of the last generations shows us no more than the almost regular seesaw of the conquests of the Makhzen and the sibas, the opposition of the chiefs and the assemblies. Two irreducible hostile forces, two irreconcilable conceptions of political life take each other's measure in the Sous as in a closed field, and the mediation of the religious powers can no longer usefully be exercised to attenuate the violence of the struggle.

*631 VI. Consequences of the tribes' submission to the Makhzen.
648 -- In spite of the efforts of the tribes and the revolts that followed
17 the end of the sultans' reigns, the nineteenth century was marked in the south of Morocco by the constant progress of the policy of the Makhzen /makhzan/. During the confused period of the first years of the French occupation, moreover, the great chiefs of the mountains and the kaids of the plains for 15 years proceeded with the transformation of the Berbère /Berber/ country with new activity.

Consequently, no region of Morocco enables us to perceive as well as the Sous does the consequences that their entrance into the Sherifian Empire entails for the small, formerly autonomous, mountain states.

The only benefit that the Makhzen brought to the Berbère /Berber/ tribes is internal order. Under the government of the
[669] kaids, struggles of soffs and leffs are indeed stopped or limited;
[578]

/412 cont./

*631 this progress still remains precarious, since passions, restrained
648 during the years in which the authority of the Sultan's representa-
17 tives is exercised without being contested, break out anew at the
[578] first "siba," with a still greater violence. The peace in which
[669] the new subjects then live is bought by the destruction of most of the traditions and customs, habitudes of local government and of primitive justice, which for the inhabitants of the mountains are inseparable from their very life.

[792] The marabouts, whose arbitration was exercised not only to stop the battles of cantons and tribes but also to settle in compliance with equity differences of a private nature, disappeared first; no longer do we see them intervene with sheiks and kaids to defend the poor and weak as they were privileged to do with the senates of "inflas" in the time of freedom. The old tribal law [671] ceases to be /413/ applied and often the day of submission marks that of its effacement. It makes way for the more distant and [693] abstract justice of the cadis, whose complaisance toward the new leaders is obvious.

*[634] At the same time, most of the economic institutions of the small Berbère /Berber/ cantons, whose regular functioning re-[343] quired the deliberation of family representatives, are smitten with [712] decline; the agadirs fall in ruins, the common treasuries are [652] squandered, the corvées for mutual aid become irregular, main-[466] tenance of the séguias and roads, even the protection of the crops [653] are no longer the object of the same care as in former times.

Finally, ownership of the land, so profoundly disturbed in cer-[423] tain regions near the cashahs of the great chiefs, becomes uncer-[166] tain; the constitution of the large domains of the kaids of the Atlas entails, in a country already too poor to feed its inhabitants, the disappearance of a large number of villages and the progressive exodus of the Berbères /Berbers/ toward regions where the security of possessions and persons is more certain.

[735] When the domination of the Makhzen /makhzan/ is established without intermediaries and allows all its weight to bear down on the tribes, thanks to the unlimited authority of foreign leaders, one sees profound poverty develop; one of the most constant principles

*631 /413 cont./
648 of the government is indeed to keep the most turbulent popula-
17 tions, or the ones most intense about winning back their liberty,
(735) calm by crushing them with ceaselessly renewed contributions.

*631 It is easy to understand that the Berbères /Berbers/, thus shut
648 up in this field of ruins, soon come to associate in their minds
17 the Makhzen with a regime of peace, oppression, and poverty,
153 while the more disturbed government of the independent republics alone seems to them capable of preserving the life of the institutions of their villages. In the servitude into which they have fallen, the development of anarchy appears to them as the only guarantee of the prosperity of families and of respect for traditions.

•(669) The "siba," the revolt, for which the Sultan's death is the awaited signal, becomes both an instinctive movement of defense against intolerable domination and an appeal to the internal forces of liberation: consequently, this explains why the first act of the tribe after destroying the kaid's house is, by a kind of unconscious gesture of the collective memory, to assemble the notables /414/ in order to restore, in a form that we still recognize, the patriarchal government of ancient times.

648 VII. The future of Moroccan Berbérie /Barbary/. -- For 20 years the establishment of France in Morocco has entirely modified the respective situation of the Makhzen /makhzan/ and the independent tribes. But it is especially since the period in which the progress of pacification multiplied our direct relations with the populations of the former "bled es siba" that the Berbère /Berber/ country has manifested, sometimes under tragic circumstances, signs of a vitality whose deep meaning we may henceforth no longer hide from ourselves.

During the first years of our Protectorate, the problems of our establishment and the organization of a country ruined by revolts were first of all associated with the restoration of the decadent institutions of the Sherifian Empire. The natural play of diplomatic action, the obligations of international treaties -- whose tenor implied the existence of a Morocco similar to the European states, united, centralized, regularly governed according to definite

/311 cont./

343 712 621 423 625 Agadir of Tizzirt (Fig. 19). -- Belongs to the village of Tizzirt (50 hearths). Certain inhabitants own up to five chambers there.

Same arrangements and operation as at Ankoutouf.

The guard is usually a man. As an exception, this job was [562] entrusted to a widow in 1928.

Agadir of Annoums (Fig. 8 and Fig. 20). -- It belongs to the village of Annoums (65 hearths).

[465] [685] [84] Five stories, all 80 chambers occupied; the guard receives a kharrouba of barley per chamber and per year. In case of theft, the custom is the same as for the agadir of Ankoutouf.

Agadir of Tamjlojt (Fig. 21). -- It belongs to the village of [465] Tamjlojt (45 hearths). Sixty rooms, four stories. The guard receives one tmen of barley and one kharrouba of maize per room [562] and per year. As an exception, this post was given to a woman last year.

Agadir of Talmakant (Fig. 16). -- It belongs to the village of Talmakant (40 hearths) and comprises 52 large rooms on two [312] stories. It can serve both as storehouse and as réduit for defense in case of attack, because of its cistern and its interior arrangement.

[682] /312/ It is in ruins in part; it has not been used any more for 25 to 30 years because an assassination was committed there.

Agadir of Assaka (Fig. 17). -- Like the preceding one, it served both as storehouse and as fortress.

[669] It was destroyed in part following internal struggles in 1925, and it is planned to put it back into condition. It serves at pres- [727] ent to shelter the numerous exiles who returned to the tribe after the submission and found their houses demolished.

Agadir of Azar (Fig. 18). -- It belongs to the village of Azar (28 hearths).

It normally serves as storehouse and in troubled times as fortress. The rooms are mortgaged for 5 to 20 douros. The [465] guard, changed every year, collects a kharrouba of barley, one kharrouba of maize, and a pound of almonds.

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

mité sur des solutions qui, en cherchant à ménager tous les intérêts, risquaient souvent de ne satisfaire personne (Loubignac, 1942, p. 284).

635 This conflict between the tribal chief and the tribal council, which
631 in the pre-Protectorate period generally resulted in victory for the
669 representative council among the Beraber, Riffians, and Shluh of
175 the Anti-Atlas, was resolved in favor of the chiefs among the Shluh of the western High Atlas. Here, a number of chiefs, taking advantage of the general state of inter-tribal warfare existing around 1893, seized absolute power within their tribes and, with the help of arms smuggled in from the coast, extended the areas of their control and established quasi-feudal caidates. The most important of these existed in the High Atlas between Safi and Mogador on the coast, to the Dades-Dra region, and included the caidates of the Abdas (headed by Si Aissa Ben Omar), of the Hahas (Anflous), the M'Tougas (Si Abd el Malek), the Goundafas (Si Tayeb Goundafi), the Glaouas (Si Madani Glaoui, and later his brother Haji Thami Glaoui), and the Ahensals (Sidi Moh Hansali) (Great Britain, 1919, pp. 157-161; La Chapelle, 1928; Montagne, 1928; 1930, pp. 269-364, 395-400; 1949, pp. 116-117).

The principalities established by these conquering *imgharin* were generally organized after the pattern established by the *Makhzen*, and somewhat resembled small independent feudal states in medieval Europe. Each *amghar* or *caid* nominally acknowledged the Sultan as temporal ruler, but actually remained independent. Each *caid* assumed the ultimate power and authority, as well as title to the land, by right of conquest. Each governed his domain through deputies, known as *khulafa'* (pl. of *khalifa*), who were usually, though not always, members of his family. Each *caid* and *khalifa* resided in a heavily fortified residence (actually a palace) known as a *kasbah* (pl. *kisab*), together with his household, men and women who tilled the land surrounding the castle for the owner's profit, masons, carpenter, a cobbler and a tailor, and the manager of a small food shop. In the literature on southern Morocco, the term *kasbah* is often erroneously applied to a *ksar*; such usage is only correct in the relatively infrequent case that a *ksar* contains a *kasbah* as at Ouarzazate (Landau, 1951, pp. 82-83).